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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 910314 
v. : 
C. DEAN LARSEN, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellee. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The following points are submitted in reply to the 
arguments presented in defendant's responsive brief. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT II 
GIVEN THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED MEANING OF THE 
PHRASE "AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW," WHICH APPEARS 
IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION, BAIL PENDING APPEAL IS PROPERLY 
VIEWED AS A MATTER OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
Defendant argues that bail pending appeal is a matter 
r procedure rather than a matter of substantive law. 
Acknowledging the split in the case law on the issue, he relies 
most heavily on federal cases which held that the provisions of 
the 1984 Bail Reform Act relating to bail pending appeal are 
procedural and therefore their retroactive application does not 
violate the ex post facto clause. While the federal cases lend 
support to defendant's position and may serve to illustrate 
further the split in the case law, those cases, unlike the state 
cases cited by the State, did not resolve a direct conflict 
between a court rule and a statute. Therefore, the State 
discussed the state cases instead of the federal cases. 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the view that bail 
pending appeal is a matter of substantive law rather than 
procedure is entirely consistent with article I, section 8 of the 
Utah Constitution, which now provides that •• [p]ersons convicted 
of a crime are bailable pending appeal only as prescribed by law" 
(emphasis added). Citing minutes from a meeting of the 
Constitutional Revision Committee (CRC)1 as his only authority, 
defendant asserts that the State erroneously implies that the 
phrase "as prescribed by law" means as prescribed by statute. 
Although the CRC may have intended differently, that phrase has 
been interpreted by the courts to mean prescribed by statute. 
See, e.g., Manchin v. Brown, 296 S.E.2d 909, 915 (W. Va. 1982) 
("The phrases 'prescribed by law' and 'provided by law' mean 
prescribed or provided by statutes."); Frans Pets, Inc. v. Aqqen, 
443 N.Y.S.2d 607, 608 (1981) ("The expression 'prescribed by law' 
refers to statutory provisions only."); Litchfield Elementary 
School v. Babbitt, 125 Ariz. 215, 608 P.2d 792, 798 (Ariz. App. 
1980) ("The term 'as may be prescribed by law' means as provided 
by legislative amendment."); Truiillo v. Tanuz, 85 N.M. 35, 508 
P.2d 1332, 1337 (N.M. App. 1973) ("'Provided by law' means 
'provided by statute law.'"); State ex rel. Wilson v. Weir, 106 
Mont. 526, 79 P.2d 305, 308 (1938) ("The words 'as may be 
1
 The CRC was created "to make recommendations to the 
governor and the Legislature as to specific proposed 
constitutional amendments." Utah Code Ann. § 63-54-3 (1989). 
As a mere advisory body to the legislature, the CRC does not set 
legislative intent. Nor would the CRC's intent override an 
interpretation of particular constitutional language by this 
Court. 
2 
prescribed by law' . . . mean as may be prescribed by act of the 
legislative assembly.")• See also Black's Law Dictionary 1224 
(6th ed. 1990) ("Provided by law. This phrase when used in a 
constitution or statute generally means prescribed or provided by 
some statute."). 
Although it appears this Court has not specifically 
interpreted the phrase "as prescribed by law," it has interpreted 
the very similar phrase "as may be established by law" to mean 
established by statute. State ex rel. Shields v. Barker, 50 Utah 
189, 191, 167 P. 262, 263 (1917) ("To be 'established by law' 
means just what it says, namely, by a law duly passed by the 
lawmaking power of this state [i.e., the legislature]."). See 
also State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775, 777 (Utah 1977) f "In State ex 
rel. Shields v. Barker the words "established by law" or 
"provided by law" were construed to mean the laws passed by the 
law-making power of this state.").2 Furthermore, the Court 
implicitly construed the phrase "prescribed by law" to mean 
statutory law when it discussed the respective authority of the 
attorney general and the county attorneys in State v. Jiminez, 
588 P.2d 707, 708-09 (Utah 1978). There, the Court first noted 
that "[t]he Attorney General and the various County Attorneys are 
constitutional officers and are empowered to perform such duties 
'as prescribed by law'" (citing Utah Const, art. VII, §§ 1 and 
"By law" technically includes constitutional amendments 
passe, by the legislature, as well as statutes it enacts. See 
Adriano v. Turner. 20 Utah 2d 350,351, 437 P.2d 891, 892 (1968) 
(interpreting phrase "until otherwise provided by law"). 
3 
18, and art- VIII, § 10), and then proceeded to refer to the 
various statutes that prescribed the duties of those two offices. 
588 P.2d at 707-09. 
A basic principle of statutory construction is that the 
legislature is presumed to be aware of this Court's decisions 
when it acts. Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 
1284-85 (Utah 1987) (legislature is presumed aware of legal 
context in which it acts). See also Horton v. Royal Order of the 
Sun, 821 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Utah 1991). In asserting that the 
State "is simply wrong" in its interpretation of the phrase 
"prescribed by law," defendant fails to account for either 
Shields, Cauble, or Jiminez, or the authority from other 
jurisdictions which undermines his proposed interpretation of 
that phrase. 
Finally, this Court's standing committee on the rules 
of criminal procedure recently approved amendments to rule 27, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which track Utah Code Ann. § 
77-20-10 (1990) (the proposed rule is contained in Appendix A). 
The proposed rule further supports the view that bail pending 
appeal is a matter of substantive law for the legislature. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT III 
EVEN IF THIS COURT WERE TO HOLD THAT BAIL 
PENDING APPEAL IS STRICTLY A MATTER OF 
PROCEDURE, THE LEGISLATURE OBVIOUSLY SOUGHT 
TO AMEND THE PROCEDURE DICTATED BY THIS 
COURT'S CASE LAW WHEN IT ENACTED UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-20-10 (1990) 
Even if this Court were to hold that bail pending 
appeal is strictly a matter of procedure, it would be unrealistic 
4 
to conclude that the legislature did not in effect amend rule 27 
when it enacted section 77-20-10. 
The parties agree on the legislature's intent in 
enacting section 77-20-10: to bring Utah's bail pending appeal 
law in line with federal law. See Br. of Appellee at 25-27. 
This marked a clear departure from the then-existing procedure 
which was based on this Court's interpretation of rule 27. See 
State v. Neelev, 707 P.2d 647 (Utah 1985); State v. Pappas, 696 
P.2d 1188 (Utah 1985). That the legislature did not specifically 
state in its legislation that it was amending rule 27 should not 
be fatal. 
First, the legislature, obviously believing that it was 
dealing with a matter of substantive law rather than procedure, 
reasonably considered it unnecessary to include such a 
statement.3 As is plain from the State's opening brief, there 
was clear support for that belief. Second, to hold under these 
circumstances that passage of the legislation by a two-thirds 
vote, the percentage required by the constitution for amendment 
to a rule of procedure, would be to ignore the obvious intent of 
the legislature and to elevate form or substance. Moreover, in 
arguing that H.B. 79's failure to clearly state an intent to 
amend rule 27 renders section 77-20-10 ineffective as an 
amendment to rule 27, defendant ignores the principle that 
3
 Where the legislature has known it was amending a rule of 
procedure rather than enacting substantive law, it has used 
explicit language to that effect. See, e.g., S.B. No. 181, 1990 
Utah Laws ch. 201, §§ 2 & 3 (Appendix B). 
5 
"legislative enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of 
validity and will not be declared unconstitutional unless there 
is no basis upon which they can be construed as conforming to 
constitutional requirements." In re Criminal Investigation, 754 
P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988). 
At bottom, there is no dispute that the legislature 
intended to change the law regarding bail pending appeal, and 
there is no good re'ason for this Court to prohibit, on a 
hypertechnical ground, that intent from taking effect. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS POINT IV 
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACKS ARE EITHER 
WITHOUT MERIT OR NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE 
COURT 
Defendant argues that the language of section 77-20-10 
that requires proof the defendant will not pose a danger to the 
"psychological, or financial and economic safety or well-being" 
of any other person or the community if released "is so vague and 
overbroad as to effectively and unreasonably preclude bail" in 
violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Br. of 
Appellee at 20-21. Beyond his failure to draw the necessary 
distinctions between a "vagueness" challenge and an "overbreadth" 
challenge*, defendant's vagueness argument (the only argument he 
* Addressing this same defect in another case, this Court 
said: 
"Vagueness" goes to the issue of procedural 
due process, i.e., whether the statute is 
sufficiently explicit and clear to inform the 
ordinary reader of common intelligence what 
conduct is prohibited. On the other hand, 
"overbreadth" relates to whether the statute 
6 
actually makes) is both premature and without merit. 
First, defendant assumes without explanation that he 
would not be granted release pending appeal if his case were 
considered by the trial court under section 77-20-10. Because it 
is not clear that defendant could not be granted release under 
the statute, his vagueness claim, insofar as it represents an "as 
applied" attack on the statute, is not properly before the Court. 
Before a party may attack the constitutionality of a statute, it 
must be clear that the party was or will be adversely affected by 
that statute. State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah 1989), 
cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1018 (1990); State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 
502, 505 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); Pride Club, Inc. v. State, 25 
Utah 2d 333, 336, 481 P.2d 669, 671 (1971). 
Second, defendant's facial vagueness challenge does not 
meet the requirements for such a challenge. In making a facial 
attack on the statute, defendant "must show that it is 'invalid 
in toto — and therefore incapable of any valid application. . . 
.' Unless the enactment is vague in all its applications, it is 
ordinarily not unconstitutional on its face." Greenwood v. City 
of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991) (quoting 
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474 (1974)). This defendant 
has not done, merely questioning, without analysis, whether the 
is so broad that it may prohibit 
constitutionally protected behavior as well 
as unprotected behavior — a question of 
substantive due process. 
State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987) (citations 
omitted). 
7 
terms "psychological safety" and "financial and economic safety" 
are subject to meaningful definition. Significantly, those terms 
are frequently used by courts in other contexts, apparently 
without much confusion as to their meaning. See, e.g., Boyle v. 
Donovan, 724 F.2d 681, 683 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (court 
refers to "economic safety" of persons); State v. Draper, 162 
Ariz. 433, 784 P.2d 259, 264 (Ariz. 1989) (court refers to 
victim's "psychological safety"); People v. Maxwell, 162 Colo. 
495, 427 P.2d 310, 312 (Colo. 1967) (en banc) (court refers to 
"financial safety" of the public). 
Finally, defendant erroneously argues that the statute 
violates the eighth amendment because it does not distinguish 
between misdemeanants and felons or violent and nonviolent 
crimes. The basic error in his claim is that this is 
postconviction, as opposed to pretrial, bail. Although he 
acknowledges that there is no constitutional right to bail 
pending appeal, defendant does not articulate why the legislature 
in crafting a law for postconviction bail could not reasonably 
apply the same legal standards to all convicted defendants. 
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit correctly rejected a similar attack 
on the 1984 Bail Reform Act in United States v. Bilanzich, 771 
F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1985): 
[The Bail Reform Act does not] violate the 
prohibition on excessive bail contained in 
the Eighth Amendment. The right to bail is 
not an absolute one, and Congress may 
restrict the category of cases in which bail 
will be allowed. The District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals, after examining the history 
of the excessive bail clause, determined that 
8 
"the primary purpose is to limit the 
judiciary," not the power of Congress. The 
situation at bar does not implicate a denial 
of bail before trial and conviction, but a 
denial of bail after a court or a jury has 
determined that the defendant has been proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The rate 
of reversal of district court decisions is 
extremely low, so that Congress' making bail 
more difficult to obtain once an individual 
has been found guilty is not unreasonable, 
nor is it impermissible under the Eighth 
Amendment. 
771 F.2d at 299-300. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT V 
THE STATE AGREES THAT THIS COURT SHOULD LOOK 
TO FEDERAL DECISIONS IN INTERPRETING SECTION 
77-20-10 
Defendant suggests that if the Court decides that 
section 77-20-10 is the controlling law, it should interpret the 
"substantial question" language of the statute as the Third 
Circuit interpreted the same language in United States v. Miller, 
753 F.2d 19 (3rd Cir. 1985). The State agrees to the extent this 
Court adopts the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of that language 
in United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944 (10th 1985)- There, 
the court adopted a slightly modified version of Miller's two-
step analysis: 
We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that "a 
'substantial question' is one of more 
substance than would be necessary to finding 
that it was not frivolous. It is a 'close' 
question or one that very well could be 
decided the other way." rUnited States v.1 
Giancola, 754 F.2d [898] at 901 [(11th Cir. 
1985)]. In Miller, the Third Circuit said 
that a "substantial" question under § 
3143(b)(2) 'is one which is either novel, 
which has not been decided by controlling 
precedent, or which is fairly doubtful.' 
9 
We agree with the Eleventh Circuit, however, 
that a question "which has not been decided 
by controlling precedent" may not be 
"substantial" under § 3143(b)(2). For 
example, an issue may be "so patently without 
merit that it has not been found necessary 
for it to have been resolved. . . . 
Similarly, there might be no precedent in 
this circuit, but there may also be no real 
reason to believe that this circuit would 
depart from unanimous resolution of the issue 
by other circuits." 
765 F.2d at 952 (citations omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments and those contained in 
the State's opening brief, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's holding that section 77-20-10 is unconstitutional and 
remand this case for reconsideration of the release question 
under the statute. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / ? # W of May, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (/ 
Assistant Attorney General 
10 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief were hand-delivered to John T. Nielsen, David 
L. Arrington, Joel G. Momberger, Jon E. Waddoups, and Melyssa D. 
Davidson, of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, 50 South Main 
Street, Suite 1600, P.O. Box 45340, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
and Larry R. Keller, 257 Towers, Suite 340, 257 East 200 South -
10, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this /ff^day of May, 1992. 




1 RULE 27. Stays pending appeal. 
2 (a) (1) A sentence of death shall be stayed if an appeal or 
3 a petition for other relief is pending. 
4 (2) A sentence of fine, imprisonment, or probation shall 
5 be stayed if an appeal is taken and a certificate of probable 
6 cause is issued. 
7 (3) When an appeal is taken by the state, a stay of any 
8 order of judgment in favor of the defendant may be granted by 
9 the court upon good cause pending disposition of the appeal. 
10 (b) A certificate of probable cause shall bo issued if the 
11 court hearing the application determines that thoro arc meritorious 
i s s u e d — t h a t — s h o u l d — f e e — d e c i d e d — f e y — f e h e — a p p e l l a t e court. A 
13 certificate of probable cause may be issued by the trial court or, 
14 if denied by the trial court,—by the court to whom an appeal is 
15 t a k e n . — T h e application for a certificate of probable cause shall 
16 fee—*n—writing, s t a t e — t h e g r o u n d s — & e & — t h e — i s s u a n c e — & € — £ k e 
17 certificate and shall bo served upon the prosecuting a t t o r n e y . — A 
IS hearing—e«—fefee—application—& e x—a certificate—e#—probable—cause 
19 shall be held after notice to all p a r t i e s . — A person who has been 
2 0 found guilty of an offense and sentenced to a term of incarceration 
21 in jail or orison, and who has filed a notice of appeal, shall be 
22 detained, unless the trial judge issues a certificate of probable 
2 3 cause and determines by clear and convincing evidence that the 
2 4 defendant is not likely to flee during pendency of the appeal and 
2 5 that the defendant will not pose a danger to the safety of any 
1 
other person or the community if released under any of the 
conditions set forth in paragraph (a). 
(c) a—a—certificate of—probable cause—is denied,—feke 
defendant shall commence or continue to undergo sentence. If the 
certificate of probable cause is granted?—the court granting the 
certificate may continue the defendant in custody at an appropriate 
place—of detention,—e&—admit—fehe—defendant—fee—bail or—release 
pending appeal on suitable terms and conditions.—The decision on 
the request—of the defendant—for release to bail—±s—subject to 
review—by—fe&e—appellate court—&&&—abuse of—discretion. If the 
trial court denies the defendant a certificate of probable cause, 
or finds that the defendant is likely to flee or poses a danger to 
the safety of any other person or the community and denies release, 
the decision may be appealed to the court in which the notice of 
appeal of the conviction has been filed. 
fd) f 1) No certificate of probable cause shall issue except 
upon application of the defendant filed with the appropriate 
court. 
(2) The application for a certificate of probable cause 
shall be in writing and accompanied by a memorandum of law 
identifying the issues to be presented on appeal and 
supporting the defendants position that those issues raise a 
substantial Question of law or fact reasonably likely to 
result in reversal, an order for a new trial or a sentence 
that does not include a term of incarceration in iail or 
prison. 
2 
1 (3) If release is denied. any appeal shall hg 
2 accompanied by an affidavit made and signed by counsel for the 
3 defendant, or by the defendant if the defendant is not 
4 represented by counsel. The affidavit shall contain the 
5 following: 
6 (k) A narration of the relevant facts developed at 
7 trial: 
8 (Bl A statement of the crime (s) of which the 
9 defendant was convicted; 
10 (C) A statement setting out the sentence imposed: 
11 and 
12 fP) A statement that the defendant has previously 
13 applied for a certificate of probable cause, setting 
14 forth the issues that were presented to the court, the 
15 courts ruling and the reasons given in support of the 
16 ruling. 
17 fe) A copy of the application for a certificate of probable 
IS cause and a copy of the memorandum shall be served on the 
19 prosecuting attorney. The prosecuting artornev may file a written 
2 0 reply within 10 days after receipt of the application. A hearing 
21 on the application shall be held within 10 days after the 
22 appropriate court receives the prosecuting attorney's reply, or if 
2 3 no reply is filed, within 15 days after the application is filed 
24 with the court. 
3 
1
 (f^ No certificate of probable cause shall issue and thp 
2
 defendant shall be detained unless the appropriate court finds that 
3 the appeal: 
4
 ID is not being taken for the purpose of delay: and 
5 (2) raises substantial issues of lav or fact reasonably 
6 likely to result in reversal, an order for a new trial or a 
7 sentence that does not include a term of incarceration in iail 
8 or prison. 
9 (a) If the court determines that the defendant may be 
10 released pending appeal, it may release the defendant on the least 
11 restrictive condition or combination of conditions that the court 
12 determines will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as 
13 required and the safety of persons and property in the community, 
14 which conditions may include, without limitation, that the 
15 defendant: 
16 (1) is admitted to appropriate bail; 
17 (2) not commit a federal, state or local crime during 
18 the period of release; 
19 (3) remain in the custody of a designated person who 
20 agrees to assume supervision of the defendant and who agrees 
21 to report any violation of a release condition to the court, 
22 if the designated person is reasonably able to assure the 
23 court that the person will appear as reguired and will not 
24 pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the 
25 community; 
4 
1 (4) maintain employment, or if unemployed, actively seek 
2 employment: 
3 (5) maintain or commence an educational program; 
4 (6) abide by specified restrictions on personal 
5 associations, place of abode or travel; 
6 (7) avoid all contact with the victim or victims of the 
7 crime(s), anv witness or witnesses who testified against the 
8 defendant and anv potential witnesses who might testify 
9 concerning the offenses if the appeal results in a reversal or 
10 an order for a new trial: 
11 (8) report on a regular basis to a designated law 
12 enforcement agency, pretrial services agency or other agency; 
13 (9) comply with a specified curfew; 
14 f10) refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive 
15 device or other dangerous weapon; 
16 (11) refrain from possessing or using alcohol, or anv 
17 narcotic drug or other controlled substance except as 
13 prescribed by a licensed medical practitioner: 
19 (12) undergo available medical. psychological or 
2 0 psychiatric treatment, including treatment for drug or alcohol 
21 abuse or dependency; 
22 f!3) execute an agreement to forfeit, upon failing to 
2 3 appear as reguired. such designated property, including money, 
2 4 as is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the 
2 5 defendant as required, and post with the court such indicia of 
5 
1 ownership of the property or such percentage of the money as 
2 the court may specify: 
3 (14) return to custody for specified hours following 
4 release for employment, schooling or other limited purposes;: 
5 and 
6 (15) satisfy any other condition that is reasonably 
7 necessary to assure the appearance of the defendant as 
8 reouired and to assure the safety of persons and property in 
9 the community. 
10 (h) The court may at any time for good cause shown amend the 
11 order granting release to impose additional or different conditions 
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CRIMINAL OFFENSE CHARGES 
By Winn L. Richards 
AN ACT RELATING TO CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE; ENACTING PROVISIONS REGARD-
ING THE CHARGING OF OFFENSES; AND 
REQUIRING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
TWO-THIRDS VOTE FOR PASSAGE. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
ENACTS: 
77-SA-l, (FORMERLY 77-35-9) UTAH CODE AN-
NOTATED 1953 
REPEALS: 
77-35-9, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 14, LAWS 
OF UTAH 1980 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Enacted. 
Section 77-8a-l, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is 
enacted to read: 
77-8a-l. Joinder of offenses and of defen-
dants. 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, 
may be charged in the same indictment or informa-
tion if each offense is a separate count and if the of-
fenses charged are^ 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise 
connected together in their commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme 
or plan. 
(2) (a) When a felony and misdemeanor are 
charged together the defendant is afforded a pre-
liminary hearing with respect to both the misde-
meanor and felony offenses. 
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the 
same indictment or information if they are alleged 
to have participated in the same act or conduct or in 
the same criminal episode. 
(c) The defendants may be charged in one or more 
counts together or separately and all of the defen-
dants need not be charged in each count. 
(d) When two or more defendants are jointly 
charged with any offense, they shall be tried jointly 
unless the court in its discretion on motion or other-
wise orders separate trials consistent with the in-
terests of justice. 
(3) (a) The court may order two or more indict-
ments or informations or both to be tried together if 
the offenses, and the defendants, if there is more 
than one, could have been joined in a single indict-
ment or information 
ID) l ne proceaure shall be the same as if the prose-
cution were under a single indictment or informa-
tion. 
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecu-
tion is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or defen-
dants in an indictment or information or by a jomd-
er for trial together, the court shall order an election 
of separate trials of separate counts, grant a sever-
ance of defendants, or provide other relief as justice 
requires. 
(b) A defendant's right to severance of offenses or 
defendants is waived if the motion is not made at 
least five days before trial. In ruling on a motion by 
defendant for severance, the court may order the 
prosecutor to disclose any statements made by the 
defendants which he intends to introduce in evi-
dence at the trial. 
Section 2. Repealer. 
Section 77-35-9, Rule 9—Joinder of offenses and 
of defendants, as enacted by Chapter 14, Laws of 
Utah 1980, is repealed. 
Section 3. Two-thirds vote required. 
The amendments to this act take effect only if this 
act is approved by two-thirds of all members elected 
to each house, as provided in Article VIII, Sec. 4 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
